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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through ,.
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Respoudent,
· Case No.
\) 11388

vs.
THOMAS V. 'V"ILLIAMS and
JO ANN H. WILLIAMS, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a highway condemnation action brought
by the plaintiff against defendants whereby certain lands
were acquired from the latter along the east side of
Highway 89 extending between Salt Lake City and
Ogden. The precise area involved is in Davis County,
along what is often referred to as the "Mountain
Road." The sole issue before this Court is that of
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whether defendants can recover damages sustained by
their contiguous remaining properties by reason of
the loss of lands taken and the construction of the
highway project in the manner contemplated.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The damage issue in this matter was tried by Hon.
Parley E. Norseth, District Judge, sitting without a
jury. Judgment was granted in favor of defendants
and against plaintiff in the total amount of $3,950.00.
Defendants thereafter filed a Motion for New Trial
seeking to have the Judgment increased to an amount
more nearly in line with the testimony of defendants'
expert witness and the holding by the Court that defendants had: sustained their burden of proof in the
matter. The Motion for New Trial was denied and, at
the same time, Judge Norseth entered a complete ruling
in the matter in his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order Denying New Trial (R. 27).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek to have the Judgment modified
by the addition of the sum of $3,896.00. Also, defendants
urgently seek a clear-cut ruling on the point of law
involved inasmuch as it substantially affects many con·
demnation cases in Utah, which are presently in litga·
tion and which will be filed in many pending acquisitions.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff condemned certain properties of the
defendants for the purpose of widening and improving
Highway 89 along the ":Mountain Road" area of Davis
County between Cherry Lane and the Uintah Junction
at the mouth of Weber Canyon. In so doing it was
necessary to acquire from defendants a strip of land
37 feet wide extending across the front, or west, end
of their property. Also, direct access was taken from
Highway 89 and a fence was constructed across the
front of their residence. Substitute access was provided
via a frontage road extending south from defendants'
property to a new entry to Highway 89 constructed for
defendants and several other property owners in the
area. At the time of trial the construction was completed and the enlarged highway had been in operation
for some time.
The properties of defendants consisted of a duplex
residence and .43 acre of land prior to the taking (R.
4, and see Parcel 94:A of Exhibit A-2 attached to the
Complaint). The Trial Court heard the matter without
a jury. The Court's Findings of Fact determined that
the tract of land and residence located thereon had a fair
market value immediately prior to the condemnation
of $28,000.00 (R. 28). It was further found that by
reason of the taking and the manner and nature of the
construction of the highway the remaining properties
not taken sustained a total diminution in their fair market value of $7 ,096.00 as their measure of damages.
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The Court further found (R. 28) that the remaining properties could be substantially restored in use
to their former value and utility by applying the "cost
of cure" approach to damages, which was reflected in
the foregoing "before" and "after" value difference
of $7 ,096.00.
The expert appraiser for plaintiff, Memory Cain
(who was also the State appraiser in the case of State
Road Commission v. Stanger- recently before this
Court) , found no proximity damages to the remainder
property since he felt that such damages were not
unique, unusual or special to defendants' remaining
properties as compared to other properties in the general
vicinity which he contended were similarly affected by
reason of the proximity of the newly constructed highway (R. 21-23).
In his Findings of Fact and in his Minute Entry
( R. 15) the Court specifically ruled that defendants
had sustained their burden of proof as to the damage
claimed, and specifically found that the proximity damage to the remaining properties resulting from sub·
stantial noise amounted to $3,896.00. The Court adopted
the "cost of cure" approach which would pay the cost
of " . . . thermopane windows along the front portion
of the home and a limited degree of air conditioning
for summertime use to facilitate sleeping conditions in
the home" (R. 29). The remainder of the diminution
in value, representing the difference between $3,896.00
and $7,096.00-or $3,200.00-was included in and made
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a part of the Judgment. However, the Court also found
that the proximity damages suffered by defendants'
property were not "special, unique and peculiar to their
property inasmuch as other properties in th4 genera:
area . . . " had sustained similar damages. The Court
then ruled as a Conclusion of Law that this proximity
damage, even though existing and measurable, was not
compensable as a matter of law (R. 30).
In his ruling Judge Norseth, being completely advised of the legal issue involved in a letter sent by the
writers ( R. 24, 25), signed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying New Trial. In
so doing he made all of the necessary findings and legal
rulings essential to this appeal so that the single issue
would be certified without any necessity for a new trial
notwithstanding how this Court should rule on the issue
involved. Consequently, upon the determination of this
appeal the Judgment should either be affirmed or, in
the alternative, modified to add $3,896.00 thereto.
Judge Norseth kindly framed the issue to this
Court in order that a decision could be made on a critical
point of condemnation law. Although appellants have
firmly believed the matter was completley resolved in
Utah in the case of Board of Education of Logan City
v. Croft, 13 U. 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 697 (1962), there has
Hot appeared to be a clear understanding of this area
of the law on the part of Utah lawyers and judges.
Except for this one ruling of Judge Norseth and several rulings of Judge Wahlquist contrary to the position
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taken by appellants in this appeal, the other judges
in Utah before whom this issue had arisen in cases where
these writers have been involved have adopted the position of the defendants. In fact, there is now pending
an appeal to this Court in the case of State of Utah, by
and through its Road Commission v. Hoenes (N6:':.5.~
a jury trial presided over by Judge Faux, where the
same issues arose. Judge Faux adopted the position
being advanced by defendants in this brief.
In view of the importance of this issue in many
eminent domain cases being tried in Utah, it is earnestly
hoped that the issue will be clearly decided in this case.

ARGUMENT
SEVERANCE DAMAGES IN EMINENT
DOMAIN CASES DO NOT HA VE TO BE SPECIAL, PECULIAR, OR UNIQUE TO THE REMAINING PROPERTY NOT TAKEN - AS
COMPARED TO DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY
OTHER PROPERTIES IN THE GENERAL
AREA-IN ORDER TO BE COMPENSABLE.
Critical to any analysis of the law of eminent
domain is the wording of the constitutional and statu·
tory provisions of the law of the State involved. Our
pertinent Utah statutory provision is contained in Section 78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The sub·
sections relating to the allowable items of compensation
(with the writer's statement under each indicating the
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type of compensation or damage classification attributable thereto) are ~et out as follows:
(1) The value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvements thereon appertaming to the realty, and of each and
every separate estate or interest therein;
and if it consists of different parcels, the
value of each parcel and of each estate or
interest therein shall be separately assessed.

(This is compensation for the TAKING)
(2) If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the
damages which will accrue to the portion
not ~ought to be condemned by reason of
its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction ot the improvement in the manner proposed by the
plaintiff.

(This is SE VE RAN CE damage)
(3) If the property, though no part thereof is
taken, will be damaged by the construction
of the proposed improvement ,the amount
of such damages.

(This is CONSEQUENTIAL damage)
There can be no dispute that this case is properly
classified as a partial-taking or "severance" case. As
such the measure of damages is prescribed by subsection
(2) of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 78-34-10.
This classification under subsection (2) as a partialtaking case is of considerable significance to a resolution
of the issue here presented. More particularly, the
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distinction between a partial-taking case (subsection 2)
and a no-taking case (subsection 3) is important to a
re.solution of the issue here presented.
Contrary to the rule allowing severance damage
in partial-taking cases, the concept allowing compensation in no-taking cases was not firmly established
until comparatively recent times. The rule which denied
compensation in no-taking cases was not invoked with
sufficient frequency to cause its justice to be seriously
questioned. The rapid growth of this country during
the early part of the 19th century caused an awareness
of the inequities in the existing rule which precluded
compensation in no-taking cases. 2 Nichols, Eminent
Domain, Section 6.4.
Liberalization of the harsh rule denying compensation in no-taking cases had its genesis in England and
in the State of .Massachusetts. In both of these jurisdictions there eventually evolved a concept which, in
varying terms, denied compensation to a landowner,
no part of whose property had been taken, where the
injury was found to have been suffered in general with
other property owners in the area. 2 Nichols, Eminent
Domain, Sections 6.41, 6.42 and 6.43.
The liberalization in England and Massachusetts
was accomplished without the aid of a constitutional
directive. It was not until 1870 that the first state,
Illinois, adopted a constitutional provision requiring
that private property should be neither taken nor
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da11utged for public use without compensation. 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain, Section 6.44.
From a superficial consideration the most natural
interpretation of these constitutional provisions would
have been to extend the existing right to recover ~ever
ance damage in partial-taking cases to those cases
where no property was taken. This would have allowed
compensation in no-taking cases for damage suffered
in common with property owners in the general area.
However, in most jurisdictions such a definition of
damages has been rejected as too broad and the limitation has been imposed requiring special and unique
damage in the no-taking case. Three reasons for this
rejection of a broad construction of the damage provision in state constitutions have been given by Nichols
in his work on eminent domain.
(a) Multiplicity of claims.
(b) Discrimination against the public sector and
in favor of the private sector.
(c) The meaning earlier given by England and
Massachusetts to the word "damage" was presumed to have been intended.
2 Nichols, Eminent Domain, Section 6.441 (1)

The na~ower interpretation given the word "damage" as it applies to no-taking cases is, in its practical
working, much the same as the Massachusetts principle
which requires the physical disturbance of a right which
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results in a special damage to property in excess of that
sustained by the public generally. The definition was
initially evolved in Illinois and has since been adopted
in almost all of the states. 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain,
Section 6.441 (3).
The Utah Supreme Court has followed the lead of
Illinois and has refused to treat the word "damage'
in Article I, Section 22, of the Constitution of Utah
as an extension of the existing right to recover for
damage to remaining land when part of a tract is taken
to cases where no property is taken. Instead, the Utah
Supreme Court adopted the more restrictive rule, as
first applied in Illinois, which requires that damage to
a tract no part of which is taken must be special, peculiar or unique and not such as is suffered in common
with the general public. Jordan v. Utah Ry. Co., 47
Utah 519, 156 Pac. 939 (1916); Twenty-Second Car·
poration v. Oregon, etc. R. R. Co., 36 Utah 238, 103
Pac. 243 ( 1909) ; Stockdale v. Rio Grande R. Co., 28
Utah 207, 77 Pac. 849 (1904); Springville Banking
Co. v. Burton, IO Utah 2d 100, 349 P. 2d 157 (1960).
The distinction between partial-taking cases and
no-taking cases, as originated by the decision not to
extend to the no-taking cases the same broad interpre·
tation as existed in the partial-taking cases, has been
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court. In fact, the
Utah Supreme Court, in explaining this difference in
the case of Board of Education of Logan City School
District v. Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 697 (1962).
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made a footnote reference to 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain, Section 6.441 ( 1), (previously cited), where the
historical development of the distinction is discussed.
Likewise, in the very recent case of Hampton v. State
nf Utah by and through its Road Commission,--·· Utah
2d .... , 445 P.2d 708 (1968), it was said:

"It should be observed that this court has developed a procedural distinction between a "taking" and "damage," for the landowner has been
denied recovery in a situation involving the liability of a highway authority for consequential
damage."
As previously noted, the Utah Supreme Court
recognized the distinction between partial-taking cases
and no-taking cases in Board of Education of Logan
City School Di:strict v. Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P. 2d
697 ( 1962) . That case involved the taking for school
grounds purposes of a portion of the property owned
by Croft. The jury verdict awarded compensation
under all three subsections of Utah Code Annotated,
1953, Section 78-34-10. This Court, realizing the irregularity, was obliged to clearly distinguish between subsection 2 (partial-taking) and subsection 3 (no-taking).
This the Court did on page 699 in the following language:
"Damage to land, by the construction of a
public or industrial improvement, though no part
thereof is taken as provided for under 78-34-10
( 3), contrary to the rule for severance da_mages,
is limited to injuries that would be actionable
at common law, or where there has been some
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physical disturbance of a right, either public or
private, which the owner enjoys in connection
with his property and which gives it additional
value, and which causes him to sustain a special
damage with respect to his property in excess of
that sustained by the public generally. It requires
a definite physical injury cognizable to the senses
with a perceptible effect on the present market
value: such as drying up wells and springs, de·
stroying lateral support, preventing surface
waters from running off adjacent lands or runnig surface waters onto adjacent lands, or the
depositing of cinders and other foreign materials
on neighboring lands by the permanent opera·
tion of the business or improvement established
on the adjoining lands." (Italics added).
The foregoing quotation explains the need for a
showing that the damage is special and unique only in
those cases which fall under subsection (3), i.e., those
cases where property is damaged though no part thereof
is taken. Other courts which have squarely faced the
issue have similarly resolved it.

In South Carolina State Highway Dep't. v. Touch·

berry, 248 S.C. 1, 148 S. E. 2d 747 (1966), the state
took 20.5 acres of a 146 acre farm. The state appealed
on the basis that the trial court had erred in submitting
to the jury for its consideration four factors as elements
of damage: (1) increased traffic noise at the landown·
er's residence, ( 2) loss of breeze, ( 3) loss of view, and
( 4) circuity of travel. The state contended that in·.
creased traffic noise resulting from the construction of
the highway near the Touchberry residence did not con·
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stitutc special damage because there was no showing
that the alleged injury was special and peculiar to the
landowner and not such as was commonly suffered by
all others whose homes were in close proximity to the
highway. The Court responded to this contention in
the manner found on page 7 48:

"This contention is apparently based upon a
misconception of the law applicable in assessing
damages to the remaining property of a landowner where a portion of an entire tract has
been condemned for a public improvement. We
quote from 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain,
Section 14.1, page 473: "A distinction must be
drawn between consequential damages to a remainder area where part of a tract is physically
appropriated and consequential damages to a
tract no part of which is physically appropriated.
In the latter case the damage must be peculiar
to such land and not be such as is suffered in
common with the general public. In the former

case it matters not that the injury i,s suffered in
common with the general public." (Ialics added)

In the above quotation the South Carolina Supreme
Court referred to a "misconception of the law." That
a "misconception of the law" does exist is evidenced
by several partial-taking cases where there has been
imposed the requirement that damages to the remainder
be special, peculiar and unique and not such as are
shared in common with the general public. However, all
cases found by these writers which directly and squarely
face the issue by recognizing and discussing the distinction between a partial-taking situation and a no-
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taking situation have resolved the issue as did the South
Carolina Supreme Court in the Touchberry case.
In State Highway Commission v. Bloom, 77 S.D.
452, 93 N.W. 2d 572, 77 A.L.R. 2d 533 ( 1958), the
state took 51.6 acres of a large cattle ranch. In discussing severance damages the Court distinguished partial.
taking cases from no-taking cases and, in regard to the
partial-taking cases, stated on page 577:

"But where a part of an owner's parcel or
tract of land is taken for a public improvement ,
such as a public highway the owner is entitled
to be compensated for the part taken and for
consequential damage to the part not taken even
though the consequential damage is of a kind
suffered by the public in common. (citing author·
ity) ." (Italics added).

City of Crookston v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 321, 69
N. W. 2d 909, 912 (1955), involved a partial taking
from each of three tracts for construction of a new
sewage treatment plant; the cases involving the three
separate tracts being consolidated for trial. The trial
court ruled that reduction in market value due to prox·
imity was not a compensable factor. In respect to tract
"B" the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.
"At the outset, it might be well to examine
a few of the basic rules governing the compensa·
bility of so-called "consequential" damage,
Where no part of a owner's land is taken but,
because of the taking and use of adjoining prop·
erty, damage is caused to an owner's land, the
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damage is not compensable unless the consequential injury is peculiar to the adjoining
owner's property and not of a type suffered by
the public as a whole. (citing authority) . However, in cases where there is a partial taking, the
injured owner is not required to show that the
injury is peculiar to his remaining property. It
is sufficient that the damage is shown to have
been caused by the taking of part of his property even though it is damage of a type suffered
by the public as a whole. (citing authority). This
is true even where the claimed damage to the
remaining property is due to the use to which
taken will be devoted by the taker.
the property
,,
Authorities on the law of eminent domain have
considered the issue at hand and have stated their findings as consistent with the Logan, Touchberry, Bloom
and Crookston cases. 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain, Sections 6.44 32 ( 2) and 6.45; 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain,
Sections 14.1 and 14.4; 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain, Section 310 ( 1966).
"Where part of a parcel of land is taken by
eminent domain, the owner is not restricted to
compensation for the land actually taken; he is
also entitled to recover for the damage to his
remaining land. In other words, he is entitled
to full compensation for the taking of his land
and all its consequences, and th~ right to recover
for the damage to his remaining land is not
based upon the theory that damage to such land
constitutes a taking of it, nor is there any requirement that the damage be special and pecu-
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liar, or such as would be actionable at common
law; it is enough that it is a consequently of the
taking... " (Italics added).
27 Am. J ur. 2d, Eminent Domain, Section 310
(1966)
There is a distinction, however, to be noted
between the assessment of compensation in the
case of a taking and in the case of a damage
when no land is taken. In the former case the
mere fact that there has been a taking entitles
the owner to recover for all damage~ to his re·
maining land, whether special or shared by the
public generally, provided they flow from the
taking, since he is constitutionally entitled to be
made whole for all injuries resulting from the
taking of his land; but when there is no taking
he is entitled only to such damages as the constitution or statutes provide, and as the damages usually provided for are held to be only
those which are special and peculiar, the mere
fact that an owner is entitled to recover such
damages is no ground for allowing damages of
a different character, although resulting from
the construction of the same work. ... " (Italics
added).
2 Nichols, Eminent Domain, Section 6.45.

The last three quotations have mentioned a limi·
tation upon the general rule that severance damage
is to be determined by the difference in fair market
value of the remaining land before and after the partial
taking. The limitation there referred to is one commonly
encountered in the practice of law; it can be stated in
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rarious ways: Severance damage must be a consequence of the taking; it must fiow from the taking,
and it must be caused by the taking and use of adjoining
property.
It is this pervasive requirement of causation which
has confused the issue of this appeal and created those
"misconception of the law" to which reference has previously been made. The requirement that severance
damage be tied causally with the partial taking and the
rule that damage in no-taking cases be special, peculiar
and unique are such that the two can be easily confused.
The two rules are definitely related.

If a landowner, part of whose parcel has been
taken, suffers a diminution in the fair market value of

his remaining tract under circumstances where the
damage cannot be causally tied to the partial taking,
then the landowner has suffered a damage which is
common to the neighborhood and noncompensable, at
least as to himself. This is so for the reason that the
damage must arise from some other point in the neighborhood if it does not arise from a partial taking of
the land in question. However, the reverse does not
follow. If all persons in a neighborhood suffer a similar
diminution in the market values of their properties,
it does not follow that all will be deprived of just compensation on the basis that none can make the causal
link. Any one or more of these persons suffering a
similar loss is entitled to compensation if he can show
that his loss is a consequence of the partial taking of
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his own property. Thus, when a landowner has been
unable to show the causal relation between his damage
and a partial taking of his property, the courts have
justifiably said that, as to the particular landowner,
the damage was noncompensable and such as was suf·
fered in general in the neighborhood. However, the
courts have not justifiably said that the damage was'
noncompensable because it was shared in common with
the public as a whole. The damage would be noncom·
pensable because it did not arise as a consequence of
the partial taking and not because it lacked the qualities,
of uniqueness and peculiarity and was suffered in com·
mon with others in the neighborhood.
This precise confusion on the part of a trial judge
was described as "unfortunate" in the yery recent case
of State of Utah by and through its Road Commis.yion,
v. Stanger, (No. 11028) .... Utah 2d .... , 442 P.2d 941
( 1968). Although appellant attempted to bring this
same issue before this Court in the Stanger case, the
issue was avoided and the decision was handed down
on other grounds. Further analysis of the issue before '
the Court in this case, together with allied matters, are
set forth in Appellants' Brief in that case. That Brief
is also being recommended to this Court as further
argument and supporting authority by the defendan!I
in this appeal.
In the case now before the Court the trial judge
made an express finding that the damage to the remain·
ing property from increased noise resulted as a conse
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queuce of the taking and use of the 37 foot wide strip
in front of the Williams' home. This 37 foot wide strip
of land was used by the condemnor for the purpose of
widening the existing roadway from two to four lanes.
The widened road was actually constructed upon land
taken from the appellants. The words of the trial judge
are contained in paragraph number 9 of the Findings
of Fact (R. 29) :
''Due to the widening of the previously existing highway, the traveled portion of the newly
constructed highway is considerably c\oser to
the residence of the defendants than before;
and such closer proximity has resulted and will
result, .jp. a substantially greater problem from
traffic noise which has reduced the value of the
remaining
properties by reason of such condition.
,,
The rule limiting severance damages to those
arising as a consequence of the taking will offer the
condemning agency sufficient protection from a multiplicity of claims. The fear that a multiplicity of claims
might render the construction of public improvements
so inordinately expensive as to materially retard development in the public sector has often been expressed as a
reason for imposing limitations upon recovery in condemnation cases. This policy reason for restricting
recovery is adequately satisfied by the causation requirement. The causation requirement insures that the condemning agency must pay for only those severance
damages which arise from its own taking of adjoining
land. In fact, this policy consideration has little appli-
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cation to the partial-taking cases where the state, a5
plaintiff, is in court on its own initiative.
Another policy reason of ten given for limiting the
recovery in condemnation cases, is that a broad definition of "damage" creates an unjust and arbitrary
discriminatlion against public improvements and in
favor of private improvements and in favor of those
damaged by the former and against those damaged by
the latter. Again, this policy consideration is inapplicable in partial-taking cases, but finds its application as
a consideration against recovery in no-taking cases.
The private sector, not having the power of eminent
domain, is never involved in a partial-taking situation.
The causation requirement insures that the condemnor
is required to pay for only that severance damage which
is attributable to a partial taking.
The trial judge in this case, in paragraph number
6 of the Fiudings of Fact (R. 28), made an express
finding that the Williams' remaining properties had
sustained a total diminution in fair market value of
$7,096.00, and that this damage resulted from the loss
of the land mken. However, in his Conclusions of Law
( R. 29 and 30) the trial judge deviated from the before
and after rule by denying compensation to the land·
owners for a portion of the damage which they had
suffered as a consequence of the closer proximity of
the roadway. The trial judge allowed as just compen·
sation the sum of $3,200.00, and not the greater su!ll
of $7 ,096.00 which he expressly found to be the differ·
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ence between the before and after values as expressed
by the market.
This Court has many times expressed its acceptance
of the rule allowing severance damages to the extent
of the difference in market values of the remaining tract
before and after condemnation. More specifically, this
Court has adopted such an approach as it relates to
proximity damages arising from the condemnation of
a strip adjacent to a resident. In State v. Ward, 112
Utah 452, 189 P.2d 113 (1948), the Utah State Road
Commission widened a road in such a manner as to
increase the proximity of defendant's home to the roadway by 35 feet. This Court clearly recognized the
proximity damages and affirmed the award of severance
damage in the amount of $3,000.00. The court spoke
of ten of proximity damages, of their effect upon market
value and of their compensability under the before and
after formula.
Other jurisdictions have recognized the effect upon
a residence of its proximity to a roadway and have been
willing to compensate for the diminution in value as
expressed by the market. State through Di:p't of HightPJays v. Bourg, 135 So. 2d 600 (Ct. App. La. 1961);
State Department of Highways v. Leger, 170 So. 2d
399 (Ct. App. La. 1965); Commonwealth, Department
of Highways v. Elizabeth Amusements Incorporated,

367 S.\V. 2d 449 (Ct. App. Ky. 1963). All three of the

cited cases involved the taking of a narrow strip for
widening of an existing roadway. In the Elizabethtown
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case, at page 452, the court affirmed the landowner'1
position as follows:
"We believe that a diminution in value of the

rem3:in~ng land _of a condemnee resulting from

proxmuty of a highway may be considered as a!i
element of condemnation damages the same as a
diminution in value resulting from proximity of
a railroad, (citing authority) , or a gas pipe line,
(citing authority), or an electric transmission
line, (citing authority). In any situation the mr
to which the condemned property will be put
necessarily will have some bearing on the existence and extent of damage to the remaining lano
of the condemnee. A common example would
be a reduction in value of residential property
resulting from the highway's being brought in
close proximity to the dwelling."
The Utah Supreme Court and other appellate
courts have looked at proximity damages with additional specificity and have held that noise may be taken
into consideration by the trier of the facts in awarding
severance damages. Depreciation in value of a remain·
ing parcel as a consequence of the taking and attribut·
able to traffic noise is compensable. State Road Com·
mission v. Christensen, 13 Utah 2d 224, 371 P. 2d 552
(1962); Zaremba v. State, 29 App. Div. 2d 773, 286
N.Y.S. 2d 379 (1968); Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Department of Highways v. Burns, 399 S.W. 2d 923
(Ct. App. Ky. 1965); South Carolina State High·
way Dep't. v. Touchberry, 248 S. C. l, 148 S. E. 2d
747 (1966); State Highway Department v. Auyusfrr
District of North Georgia Conference of the Methodi.il
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Church, 115 Ga. App. 162, 154 S. E. 2d 29 (1967).
Noise is unquestionably a matter which a willing buyer
in the open market would consider in determining the
price he would pay for any given piece of real property. Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State, 68 Cal. Rptr. 235
(Ct. App. 1968) .
In State Road Commission v. Christensen, 13
Utah 2d 224, 371 P. 2d 552, 554 (1962), this Court
entertained an appeal by the State Road Commission
from an award of $5,500.00 for taking and severance.
Iu affirming the district court, this Court ref erred to
the landowner's claim " ... to have suffered damage
by the heavy traffic and loud noises from the through
highway being built." As to this and other claims this
Court stated " ... that there was ample evidence to
support the amount of severance damages awarded

In State Highway Department v. Augusta District
of North Georgia Conference of the Methodist Church,
115 Ga. App. 162, 154 S.E. Sd 29, 30 (1967), the
condemnee was left with remaining property improved
by four cabins which were in close proximity to the
newly constructed highway. The Georgia State Highway Department challenged an award of severance
damages. To this challenge the appellate court responded as follows:
"If shown to affect adversely the value and
use of the condemnee's remaining property, evidence of noise and other elements may be taken
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into consid.eration by the _j~ry in determining
consequential damages. ( c1tmg authority)."
The case of South Carolina State Highway Dep't.
v. 'l.'o'Uchberry, 248 S.C. 1, 148 S. E. 2d 747 (1966),
was previously cited for the propo~ition that damage~
to a remainder area where part of a tract is physically
appropriated need not be special, unique or peculiar
but may be suffered in common with the general
public. That case, as part of its holding, allowed com.
pensation for damage from increased traffic noise
against the state's contention that the increased traffic
noise near the Touchberry residence was not special
but was suffered by all others whose homes were in close
proximity to the highway.
The severance damage which can be caused by
noise and vibration is well demonstrated in the overhead
flight cases which have arisen near the nation's airports.
N oi~e and vibration have been considered as so sub·
stantial as to amount to a taking of private property.
These cases consider noise and vibration as factors
which limit the utility of the land and cause a diminu·
tion in its value. United States v. Causby, 328 U. S.
256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L. Ed. 1206 ( 1946); Thornburg
v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 376 P. 2d 100 ( 1962).
In the instant case the appraiser for appellants
adopted what has been termed a "cost of cure" approach
to the determination of damages. The trial judge in
paragraph number 7 of the Findings of Fact (R. 28)
specifically found that the nature of the damages in
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the case reasonably justified such an approach inasmuch
as an expenditure of funds would permit a restoration
in use of the properties to substantially their former
condition. This "cost of cure" approach was relied upon
in determining the total amount of severance damages,
both those ruled compensable and those ruled noncompensable. The introduction to Findings of Fact recites
that the appellants sustained their burden of proof as
to all items of damage claimed (R. 27).
The Utah Supreme Court, as well as other courts,
has expressed its app~oval of the "cost of cure" or
restoration approach " ... when such restoration costs
accurately measure the decrease in the market value of
the property damaged but not taken . . . " State v.
Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 P. 2d 113, 117 ( 1948). The
Ward case properly required restoration costs to serve
as a measure of the diminution in value. Restoration
costs were disallowed in that case because they greatly
exceeded the diminution in market value.
In the instant case paragraph number 6 of Findings of Fact ( R. 28) specifically recites that the difference between the before and after values of the remaining property is $7,096.00. A summation of the two
"cost of cure" items as contained in paragraphs number
8 and 9 of Findings of Fact (R. 28 and 29) totals
$7,096.00, and represents a method whereby damage
to the remainder is mitigated by applying a cure.
The application of the restoration or "cost of cure"
approach to severance damage attributable to n01se,
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while being seldom practical, is not unique to this case
Such a mea1mre of damage attributable to noise receiveri
the express approval of the appellate court in Stair
Highway Departrnent v. Augusta District of Nori!:
Georgia Conference of the Methodist Church, 115 Ga
App. 162, 154 S.E. 2d 29 ( 1967).

CONCLUSION
The trial judge in this case recognized the diminutioL
in market value to the appellants' remaining proper~
as a consequence of the land taken and the manner ana
nature of the construction of the public improvemem
( R. 28) . A portion of this diminution in value wru
attributed to increased traffic noise ( R. 29). Suen
amount attributable to increased traffic noise was helo
to be noncompensable as a matter of law because othei
persons in the neighborhood were similarly darnagel
(R.ao).
Since appellants have suffered proximity damagt
as a consequence of the taking and the future use ol
their own property, the Utah Constitution and the spirit
of justice demands compensation. To deny this com
pensation on the basis that some neighbors might have
suffered the same injury-and without even knowin~
whether any or all of them might or might not be i
court under similar circumstances-would be to invokr
a harsh and unfair requirement which is foreign to th1
common law. Such a requirement has no place in'
11
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partial-taking or "severance" case. The requirement
arose from no-taking cases, has historically been limited
to those cases, and should continually be restricted to
no-taking cases, where it possibly performs a function.
So long as severance damages flow from the taking
of a portion of appellants' land, the State should not
be heard to complain that the cost of "just compensation" is so inordinately expensive as to retard improvements. Such a complaint might be appropriate in a notaking case where the State is not in court, but where
the State is in court on its own volition, it should compensate for the consequences of its acts.
There is another very practical reason why a property owner's compensable severance damages should not
be limited to those which are special, unique and peculiar.
Trials involved with the issue of whether or not damages
are suffered in common with others in the general area
would degenerate into a neighborhood "witch hunt" to
find someone with a similar problem arising from road
building or similar activity. In a great many trials the
complete neighborhood or town would literally be on
trial and the resulting dispute arising from a comparison
of damages to remaining properties could often dwarf
the issue of determining just compensation for the
unfortunate litigant having his property taken against
his will. Damage to neighboring properties would have
to be measured against that to property directly involved in the lawsuit and the degree of similarity of
damage would further complicate the whole picture.
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And appraisers would be obliged to investigate ai
neighboring properties and make numerous comparisoni
while testifying, resulting in added expense, the con·
sumption of time, and the likelihood of prejudice to
the property owner.
The Judgment should be modified and the law
should be clearly set forth consistent with the position
advanced by appellants in this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. FULLER and
ORV AL C. HARRISON
Attorneys for Appellants
15 East 4th South Street

Salt Lake City, Utah
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